Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Ron J. Villeneuve, et al v. Philip D. Schamanek, et al
: Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsStephen B. Mitchell; Attorneys for Plaintiffs-RespondentsGary
A. Frank; Philip D. Schamanek
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Villeneuve v. Schamanek, No. 17343 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2494

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RON J. VILLENEUVE and
BEVERLY VILLENEUVE,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Respondents, )
)

vs.

)

PHILIP D. SCHAMANEK,
Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. 17343

)

)

)

)

APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, JUDGE

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, E.141.
BURBIDGE, MABEY & MITcnu.
438 East 200 South, lhaite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 841U .
Attorneys for Resp~;

·..;,'/..'

GARY A. FRANK, Esq.
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorney for Appellant

----

. ---~ . ,..,....,..,,.,.
pa_....._-........ •·...··<. . ,

,~..----..~-a·~:Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RON J. VILLENEUVE and
BEVERLY VILLENEUVE,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Respondents, )
)
VS.

)

CASE NO. 17343

)

PHILIP D. SCHAMANEK,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, JUDGE

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq.
BURBIDGE, MABEY & MITCHELL
438 East 200 South, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
GARY A. FRANK, Esq.
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~ABLE

OF CONTENTS
PAGE

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

7

I.

II.

BECAUSE THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY HAS BEEN
SOLD AT SHERIFF'S SALE, WHICH SALE HAS BECOME
FINAL, THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS APPEAL
IS MOOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE NOTICE UTILIZED
BY RESPONDENTS OF THEIR INTENT TO FORECLOSE
THE CONTRACT AS A MORTGAGE
. . . . .

8

A.

B.

C.

D.

III.

Respondents Were Not Required to Give
Appellant Any Notice Prior to Commencing a Lawsuit to Foreclose the Contract
as a Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

The Fact That the Notices Were Not
Mailed to Appellant's Resident Did Not
Render the Notices Ineffective . . . .

11

The Fact That the First Notice Demanded
Payment of the December Monthly Payment
Does Not Render the Notice Insufficient

14

The Fact That the First Notice Included
a Demand for the Fire Insurance Premiums Does Not Render the Notice Insufficient . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR
ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL

CONCLUSION

.........

17
17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AUTHORITIES CITED
PAGE

American Savings & Loan Association v.
Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Ut. 1968) .

10

FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc.,
409 P.2d 670 (Ut. 1965)

17

Hallstrom v. Beuhler, 378 P.2d 355 (Ut. 1963)

9

Rothey v. Stereo-Rama, Inc., 506 P.2d 63
(Ut. 1973)...
. .....

10

Thomas v. Foulger, 264 P. 975 (Ut. 1928)

9

Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.,
508 P.2d 538 (Ut. 1973) . . . . . . . .

17

Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co., 608 P.2d 236
(Ut. 1980) . . . .
. ....

10

OTHERS:

•

Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

7

II SUMMARY OF UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW
(B.Y.U. Legal Studies 1978)
. . . . . . . .

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RON J. VILLENEUVE and
BEVERLY VILLENEUVE,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs-Respondents, )
)
vs.
)
)
PHILIP D. SCHAMANEK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)

CASE NO. 17343

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the
5th day of September 1980, which Judgment foreclosed Respondents' mortgage on the real property which is the subject
of this action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents request this Court to either dismiss the
appeal for mootness or affirm the Summary Judgment and to
award Respondents their attorneys' fees and costs incurred
0n

this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Objections to Appellant's Factual Statements.

Initially, Respondents do not believe the following
factual statements made by Appellant are accurate:
1.

Appellant states (P. 2) that by letter dated

December 18, 1979, Respondents declared the entire unpaid
balance under the contract immediately due and payable
This statement is incorrect.

The December 18, 1979 lettu

gave notice that unless the amounts in default were paid
within ten days, Respondents would declare the entire amounc
due.
2.

Appellant states (P. 7) that as of December,

1979, Appellant was maintaining fire insurance on the premisd
There is absolutely no evidence to support this

I
I

assert~n

and Appellant does not cite any such evidence in the record

B.

I

I

Respondents' Statement of Facts.

I

On or about March 30, 1978, pursuant to a Uniform Rea: I
Estate Contract, Respondents sold the real property which

,

I

15

I

the subject of this action, which is improved with a duplex

1

I

and is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, to Thad H. Brown

I
I

1

and Paula Brown (R.34).

On or about August 31, 1979, all oi

the purchasers' interest under the Uniform Real Estate Cont:'!
was assigned to Appellant (R. 36).

Appellant did not norifv ,

Respondents of this Assignment or of any address at which he
could be contacted

(R. 33&79).

The Assignment recited that

Appellant's address was 7040 So. Campus Drive, Salt Lake(':
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah 84121 (R.36).
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i

In late September or October, 1979, Respondent
Beverly

Villeneuve was informed by a third party that

Appellant and Gail Schamanek had received an assignment
of the purchasers' interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

In the middle of October 1979, when Respondents had

not received the first monthly payment of $487.70 due from
Appellant, she telephoned Defendant Gail Schamanek to inquire
about the payment.

Mrs. Schamanek told Mrs. Villeneuve at

that time that she was glad she had called because Mrs.
Schamanek did not know where to send the payment and that
Hrs. Schamanek would send the payment out immediately.

A few

days later Respondents did receive the first and only payment
ever made on the Uniform Real Estate Contract by Appellant.
The check for the payment was signed by Gail Schamanek and
the address on the check was 7040 So. Campus Drive, Salt Lake
City, Utah, the same address listed for Appellant on the
Assignment (R.79).

Thereafter, Appellant defaulted by failing

to pay the November and December monthly payments, and taxes
and insurance due on the Uniform Real Estate Contract, even
though Appellant was receiving approximately $600.00 a month
in rents from the property and Respondents were required to
keep paying a monthly payment of approximately $370.00 on
an underlying Trust Deed to prevent the beneficiaries from
foreclosing on the property (R.32-38).
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By letter dated December 18, 1979 (R. 37), Respondents
gave notice to Appellant that unless the sums needed to
bring the contract current were paid within ten days, that
Respondents would elect pursuant to paragraph 16C of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract to treat the contract as a note
and mortgage, pass title subject thereto and declare the
entire unpaid balance immediately due and payable.

This lett,

was addressed to Appellant Philip Schamanek and Gail Schaman,,
7040 So. Campus Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121, because
that was the address which was listed on the check for the
October payment, Gail Schamanek had held herself out to
Respondents as an owner of the property, and Respondents
believed that she was Philip Schamanek 's wife (R. 33&79).
When Appellant still had failed to make any payments after Ju
days to bring the contract current, a second letter was sent
by Respondents dated January 18, 1980 (R. 39), giving notice
that Respondents had elected to treat the Uniform Real Estatt
Contract as a note and mortgage, pass title subject thereto
and declare the entire unpaid balance immediately due and
payable.

Respondents also enclosed a Warranty Deed in the

name of Appellant and Gail Schamanek as grantees (R. 23) · Th;
letter was also sent to the Campus Drive address.

Gail

Schamanek admittedly received both notices and called Respon·
dents' attorney during the latter part of January and first
part of February to talk about the contract (R.15&16).
Defendant Gail Schamanek at all relevant times held
herself out to Respondents as an owner of the property
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(R J]

She was the only person with whom Respondents communicated
concerning the property (R.33) and she made the only payment
that was made by Appellant on the Property (R.79).

The fire

insurance policy which was obtained by the Schamaneks on
the subject property some time in 1980 (a copy of which
was mailed to Respondents), listed Gail Schamanek, not Appellant,
as the insured under the policy (R.82&83).

At no time have

Respondents been informed of the address for Appellant, so
the only way they had to contact him was at the Campus Drive
address (R.79).
On or about January 25, 1980, Respondents commenced
this action to foreclose their mortgage on the subject
property.

A copy of the Summons and Complaint was served

at the Campus Drive address on February 16, 1980 (R. 5).

No

responsive pleading was filed and on or about March 19, 1980,
a Default Judgment was entered ordering that the subject
property be sold at Sheriff's Sale (R. 9).

The Defendants

subsequently moved to set aside the default on the basis
that the Summons and Complaint had not been properly served
(R.11).

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the Court

granted such motion (R.18).

This was the first time that

Respondents were informed that Defendant Gail Schamanek had
not received any interest in the subject real property and
that Appellant Philip Schamanek was the sole assignee of
:he purchasers' interest.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thereafter, and on or about April 28, 1980, RespondeD'.
filed an Am.ended Complaint seeking to foreclose their mortga;,
on the subject real property

as against Appellant only.

Tt,

Am.ended Complaint also sought reformation of the Warranty
Deed previously given by Respondents to Appellant and Gail
Schamanek to delete Gail Schamanek as a grantee (R.20).
On or about May 15, 1980, Respondents filed a motion
in District Court to have a receiver appointed for the subje;:
property pursuant to the terms of the contract between
parties (R. 40).

t~

At the hearing on this motion, Appellant's

counsel offered to tender into Court all sums required to
bring the contract current and to thereafter pay all monthb
payments into Court during the pendency of the action if the
Court would deny the motion to appoint a receiver.

Based

upon the stipulation of the parties at the hearing, the Gour:
entered an Order giving Appellant 20 days in which to make
I

the payments into Court and providing that in the event thes,

I

payments were not paid into Court, a Receiver would be
appointed to manage the property during the pendency of the
action (R. 47).

Appellant still failed to make any payments

into Court and, in fact, even as of then had never tendered
any amount wh atsoever to Respon d en t s CR . 80) .

Resp ondents so:·,'

sequently moved for Summary Judgment foreclosing their mortg:;:
on the subject property as against Defendant Philip Schamane
1
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and reforming the Warranty Deed which they had given to delete
Gail Schamanek as a grantee.

After three continuances were

granted at the request of Appellant's counsel, this motion
was granted by the Court and Judgment was entered on September

5, 1980 (R. 84).

Appellant appeals from that portion of the

Judgment foreclosing Respondents' mortgage.

Defendant Gail

Schamanek did not appeal from that portion of the Judgment
reforming the Warranty Deed.
Appellant did not seek to stay enforcement of the
Summary Judgment and on or about October 14, 1980, the subject
real property was sold at foreclosure sale for the full amount
of Appellant's indebtedness (R.98).

The period within which

Appellant could redeem the property expired April 14, 1981,
and the Sheriff's Sale is now final (Rule 69, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure) .

ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY HAS BEEN SOLD

~SHERIFF'S SALE, WHICH SALE HAS BECOME FINAL, THE SUBJECT

MATTER OF THIS APPEAL IS MOOT.
As previously stated, Appellant did not seek to stay
enforcement of the Trial Court's Judgment and on October 14,
l98Q, the property was sold at Sheriff's Sale.

Pursuant to

Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellant had six

months within which to redeem the subject property from the
S\eriff' s Sale.

He did not do so.

Consequently, the Sheriff's
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Sale has become final and Appellant has no further right
title or interest in the subject property.

Thus, this app'° I

by which Appellant seeks to challenge the foreclosing of th;
mortgage on the subject property has been rendered moot as

the foreclosure has been completed and title passed pursua,.1
to Sheriff's Deed.
II.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS

TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE NOTICE UTILIZED BY RESPONDENTS
THEIR INTENT TO FORECLOSE

OF

THE CONTRACT AS A MORTGAGE.

Appellant does not dispute that he defaulted under

I

the contract and that in fact the only payment he ever made
under the contract was the October 1979 payment of $487.70
Rather, Appellant seeks to find some technical deficiency
in the notices given to him in order to avoid the consequent:!
of his almost total failure to comply with his obligations
under the contract.

Specifically, Appellant claims that the

Summary Judgment should be reversed because there is a
genuine issue of fact as to the sufficiency of the December

18, 1979 notice given by Respondents of their election to
accelerate the balance due under the contract and foreclose
the contract as a mortgage because:

1.

The notices were not mailed to Appellant's

residence in Las Vegas, Nevada;

2.

.
The December 18 notice included
a d emand for

. 70, wher
the December monthly payment in the amount Of $48 7

this payment was allegedly not delinquent; and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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l

3,

The December 18 notice demanded payment of the

amount of $86. 00 for fire insurance when the fire insurance
was

allegedly being maintained by Appellant under a separate

policy.
For the reasons set forth below, Respondents respectfully submit that these contentions lack merit and that the

notices given were in fact sufficient as a matter of law to
entitle Respondents to accelerate the remaining balance due
under the contract and foreclose the contract as a mortgage.
A.

Respondents Were Not Required to Give Appellant

Any Notice Prior to Commencing a Lawsuit to Foreclose the
Contract as a Mortgage.
In the absence of a contractual provision requiring
notice, no notice need be given by a mortgagee prior to
accelerating the payments due under a mortgage by virtue of
the default of the mortgagor.

Hallstrom v. Beuhler, 378

P2d355 (Ut. 1963); Thomas v. Foulger, 264P. 975 (Ut. 1928);
II SUMMARY OF UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW, pp. 382-383.

Thus, the

only notice requirement in the present case is that contained
in paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which provides that:
"In the event of a failure to comply with the
terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the
Buyer to make any payment or payments when the
same shall become due, or within thirty (30) days
thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall have
the following alternative remedies:

..

'

"C. The Seller shall have the right, at his
option, and u on written notice to the Bu er, to
declare the entire unpaid a ance hereunder at once
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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due and payable, and may elect to treat this
contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title
to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with
the laws of the State of Utah.
. . " (R. 35)
(Emphasis added)
Under this provision, 30 days after Appellant defaulted unq
I

the contract by failing to make the various payments requir:i
thereunder

Respondents were entitled to immediately accelt:.1

the balance owing by simply notifying Appellant that they
elected to do so and without any prior warning.

>.•.

See,~.

1

I
I

I

Rothey v. Stereo-Rama, Inc., 506 P.2d 63 (Ut. 1973); Amerk·I

-1

Savings

& Loan Association v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Ut.

ll~!

It seems this minimal notice requirement was satisfied wher I
Appellant was served both with the Complaint and Amended

I

Complaint in this action.
Moreover, under Utah law it is doubtful that Appello:

I
I

I

as an assignee of the Buyer's interest under the Uniform R"-i
Estate Contract, was entitled to any notice whatsoever even
if the original Buyer under the contract was entitled to
notice.

Thus, in Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co. , 608 P. 2d 236

(Ut. 1980), this Court held that the assignee of the Buyer': i
interest under a Uniform Real Estate Contract was not entid.I
to any notice of the Seller's election to forfeit the Buyer' i
interest, whether or not the Seller had actual or construcr:
notice of the Assignment.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Respondents sent a
letter on December 18, 1979 (48 days after the initial defa<
d r t'·'

occurred), giving notice that unless the defaults un e
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

........

contract were cured within ten days, Respondents would accelerate
the entire unpaid balance and foreclose the contract as a
mor[gage.

When Appellant had still not made any payments 30

days after the initial notice was given, Respondents sent
a further letter dated January 18, 1980, giving notice that
Respondents were accelerating the balance due under the contract
and had elected to foreclose the contract as a mortgage.

Cer-

tainly, i f Appellant was not entitled to any notice of Respondents' election to foreclose, he cannot complain about the
alleged technical deficiencies in the notices that were given
to him.
B.

The Fact That the Notices Were Not Mailed to

Appellant's Residence Did Not Render the Notices Ineffective.
Even if Respondents were required to give Appellant
notice of their election to foreclose the contract as a mortgage prior to commencing suit, the fact that both the December
18, 1979 and January 18, 1980 notices were not sent to
Appellant's unknown residence in Las Vegas, Nevada, does not
rmder those notices ineffective.
I

.I

In the first place, although Appellant complains about
the sufficiency of the notices given because they

were sent

i

·1

to Appellant and Gail Schamanek at Gail's address on Campus
Drive in Salt Lake City, it is very significant that Appellant
has ~ claimed that he did not receive these notices or
that he was prejudiced in any way by the fact that the notices
..,ere sent to the Salt Lake City address.

Furthermore, Gail

:,:; amanek admitted receiving the notices and never once claimed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in this action that she did not inform Appellant of the
notices.
The notices were sent to Philip and Gail Schamanek at
the Campus Drive address in Salt Lake City because the only
notice that Respondents received of the Assignment was from a
third party to the effect that Philip and Gail Schamanek had
received an Assignment of Contract and that was the address
on the check for the October payment.

In fact, the "Purchase:

Quit Claim Deed and Assignment of Contract" by which Appellan:
received his interest in the property on August 31, 1979,
recited that Appellant's address was 7040 So. Campus Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121.

This fact alone justifies

Respondents' sending of the notices to that address.

Neither

Appellant nor anyone else ever informed Respondents of Appellr
residence address in Las Vegas, where he allegedly moved in
November 1979, after he had defaulted under the contract. Th
'

i

it would have been impossible for Respondents to send notices!

I

to Appellant's Las Vegas address.

Certainly, if Appellant

expected to receive notices in connection with the contract
at that address, it was his burden to supply Respondents with
the necessary information.
Moreover, it is undisputed from the evidence that at
the very least Gail Schamanek was acting as Appellant's agent
with respect to the Uniform Real Estate Contract and the prop(
covered thereby such that the mailing of the notices to her
address was certainly sufficient notice under the contract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

Gail Schamanek at all times held herself out to Respondents
as an owner of the property and all the connnunications which
Respondents had concerning the contract were with Gail
Schamanek, not Appellant.

In fact, after the notices were

sent out, it was Gail Schamanek who contacted Respondents'
attorneys respecting the notices.

It is also extremely signifi-

cant that it was Gail Schamanek who made the only payment made
by Appellant to Respondents under the contract and the address

listed on the check by which payment was made was the Campus
Drive address in Salt Lake City, to which address the notices
in relation to the contract were sent by Respondents.

Further-

more, the fire insurance policy which was obtained by Appellant
some time in 1980, also listed Gail Schamanek at the Campus
Drive address as the insured owner.

Under these circumstances,

it seems somewhat disingenuous for Appellant to complain about
the fact that the notices in relation to the contract were
sent to the Campus Drive address.
Finally, even if Appellant had not received the notices
prior to the filing of this lawsuit, he certainly received
notice both when the Complaint and Amended Complaint were
served.

Yet, Appellant still did not tender any money to

cure the defaults even though he was receiving substantial
rents from the property.

Perhaps, the most compelling evidence

that Appellant's claim of insufficient notice is and always
has been a "smoke screen", designed simply to attempt to buy

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

more time while he tried to come up with the money necessar
to cure the defaults, is the fact that in June 1980, six
months after the first notice was sent, at a hearing in the
District Court on Respondents' Motion for Appointment of a

I

Receiver, Appellant's counsel offered to pay into Court all

I

amounts necessary to bring the contract current if the Coun
would refuse to appoint a Receiver.

Based upon that offer

I
Court wit .. I

and upon the stipulation of Respondents, the Court entered
an Order allowing Appellant to pay such funds into

20 days.

Appellant wholly failed to comply with that Order

and did not tender one cent into Court.
C.

The Fact That the First Notice Demanded Payment c:

the December Monthly Payment Does Not Render the Notice
Insufficient.
Appellant's argument that the December 18, 1979 notice!
of default was defective because it included a demand for

ttl

December monthly payment in the amount of $487. 70 when that

1

payment was allegedly not yet delinquent is similarly unavaL!

ing.
In the first place, the December payment was due and
payable on December 1, 1979, and was in fact delinquent whe::
the first notice of default was sent on December 18, 1979
The fact that paragraph 16 of the contract required Responio •
to wait for 30 days after a default occurred before accelerc:j
the balance due under the contract does not mean that a pav::',
is not delinquent until it is more than 30 days late.

This

fact is clear from paragraph 3 of the contract which spec>
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

provided that a delinquency charge would be made for any
payment made more than 15 days after the due date.

More impor-

tantly, whether or not the December 1, 1979 payment was delinqJent at the time the notice was sent is totally irrelevant
because it is undisputed that at the time the notice was
sent Appellant was in default because he had not made the
November payment or paid the taxes due and Appellant did
not tender to Respondents any of the amounts in default.

Further-

mre, Respondents did not actually exercise their election to
foreclose until their notice of January 18, 1980, at which
time even the December payment was undisputedly more than 30
days delinquent,

Finally, Appellant never objected to the

fact that the December 18, 1979 notice included a demand for
the December payment either when the notice was sent or in
the Court below and raises this argument for the first time
on appeal.

Appellant does not claim and cannot show that he

was prejudiced in any way by the inclusion of a demand for
the December payment.
D.

The Fact That the First Notice Included a Demand

for the Fire Insurance Premiums Does Not Render the Notice
Insuff ic ien t .
The final basis upon which Appellant seeks to invalidate
the notices sent to him by Respondents, is that the first
notice of December 18, 1979 included a demand that he reimburse Respondents for a fire insurance premium of $86. 00, which
they had been required to pay.

Appellant, again, makes this

~lairn for the first time on appeal on the basis that he was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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allegedly already paying fire insurance in December of 191 \
under a different policy.
Pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract, Appellant was required to maintain insurance on
the property, to assign the insurance policy to Respondents
to the extent of their interest in the property, and to de!:·
a copy of the insurance policy to Respondents.

There is

absolutely no evidence in the record to substantiate Appel·
lant 's contention, made for the first time before this Cour:
that he already had fire insurance on the property in Decel!:
of 1979 under a different policy for which he had already
paid the premium.

Furthermore, Appellant does not even con·

tend, and there is certainly no evidence in the record to si
that Appellant had assigned that insurance policy to Respon·
dents to the extent of their interest or delivered a copy o'
the policy to them.

More importantly, Appellant never objec:

to the fact that a demand for fire insurance was included ir
the notice and such demand certainly didn't prejudice
Appellant because he didn't tender any of the amounts in
default.
Thus, Respondents respectfully submit that the notic:
given Appellant were more than sufficient to entitle them

t.

I
avail themselves of the remedy provided by paragraph 16C I

of the contract to accelerate the entire balance und~ t~ !
contract and foreclose the contract as a mortgage.

As Appt.I

lant admittedly was in default under the contract, no genui:I
. stri.· ct Court proo,:i
issue of material fact existed and the Dl.
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granted Summary Judgment.

FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc.,

404 P.2d 670 (Ut. 1965); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation

corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Ut. 1973).
III.

RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR

ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL.
Under paragraph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract
(R.35), Respondents are entitled to recover all attorneys'
fees incurred in pursuing any remedy provided for by the
contract.

Consequently, Respondents respectfully submit that

they are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees incurred on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Appellant made one payment of $487.70 in October 1979
and then admittedly defaulted under the contract between the
parties by not making any further payments notwithstanding
the fact that Appellant was receiving substantial rents from
the property and Respondents were required to continue making
monthly payments of $370.00 on an underlying Trust Deed encumbering the property.

Even though Respondents were probably

not required to give any notice to Appellant prior to instituting
a foreclosure action, Respondents did in fact give Appellant two
separate notices and gave him substantially more time than
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required by law to cure the defaults prior to electing to
foreclose the mortgage.

These notices were sent to the

address listed by Appellant on the Assignment he received.
Appellant does not deny that he received these notices or
contend that he suffered any prejudice whatsoever because of
the address to which the notices were sent or the form of the
notices.

The Trial Court, recognizing these facts, refused

to be a party to Appellant's efforts to further delay this
matter and entered Summary Judgment.

Pursuant to that Judg·

ment, the subject property was sold at Sheriff's Sale a~
Appellant failed to redeem the property within the six month;
allowed by law.
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's
determination was correct that no genuine issue of material
fact exists with respect to this action and that the Judgment
should either be affirmed or the appeal dismissed because the
subject of the appeal has been rendered moot.
DATED this 7~

day of May, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,
BURBIDGE. MABEY & MITCHELL
By

~ - Cv\vGli&s~
.f MITCHELL . ;
438 East 200 South, su ir; ·

1
Salt Lake City, Utah 841
Attorneys for Respondents
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